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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
RUSSELL S. SCHOW, et al, i 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
GUARDTONE, INC., et al., \ 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CASE 
NO. 10546 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT GUARDTONE INC. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Appellants together with 32 other Plaintiffs filed suit 
to set aside certain contracts entered into by them for the 
purchase of merchandise, on rt:he ground that Respondents 
were guilty of fraudulent representations as to the inten-
tion of Respondents to perform certain ancillary agree-
ents in connection with a "Referral Sales Program". 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellants' statement of the disposition of the case 
in the lower Court is essentially correct except rt:Jhat Re-
spondent Guardtone Inc., at the close of Appellants' evi-
dence, made a Motion For A [)irected Verdict in 1·ts f avor 
which motion was taken under advisement by the Cow~ 
(TR. 106). The motion was renewed by Respondent Guarct. 
tone Inc. at the close of all of the evidence (TR. 132). 
After a verdict of the jury in favor of Appellants, Re.spond-
ent Guardtone Inc. made an Alternative IVIotion For Judg. 
ment Notwithstanding the Verdict or For A New Trial 
(R. 168). Said motion was granted by the Court below 
and Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, no cause of , 
action, was entered. The Alternative Motion For A New 
Trial was also conditionally granted, to take effect only in 
the event the Judgment Notwithstanding The Verdict, no 
cause of action, should be reversed upon appeal (R. 184). 
R~PONDENT'S POSITION ON APPEAL 
Respondent Guardtone Inc. seeks affirmance of the 
action of the Court below in entering its Judgment Nat· 
withstanding The Verdict. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Guardtone Inc. agrees with the statement 
of facts as outlined by the Appellants in their brief to the 
extent that such statement discloses that the Appellan1S ' 
entered into contracts for the purchase of a fire alarm and 
intercommunication system, but it believes that a more 
detailed statement of the transactions will be helpful to 
the Court. Consequently, Respondent Guardtone Inc. set.I 
forth the following statement as to the facts in this CP~~ , 
On or about the 7th day of September, 1962, Appellants 
executed and delivered four separate instruments to one 
Albert J. Hu~es, agent for Guardtone of Utah, a Utah 
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corporation, and Respondent Guardrtone Inc., a Nevada 
Corporation, in connection with Appellants' purchase of 
an inter-com system and fire alarm installation, as evi-
denced by Exhibit No. 1, indicated as a Contract; Exhibit 
No. 2, denominated as a Home Modernization Contract; 
Exhibit No. 5, oharacterized as a Bonus Apporintment Guar-
antee; and Exhibit No. 6, characterized as an Advertising 
Agreement. The Contract, the Home Modernraation Con-
tract and the Bonus Apointmnt Guarantee were signed by 
Albert J. Hughes on behalf of Guardtorne of Utah and the 
Advertising Agreement was signed by Albert J. Hughes 
0n behalf of Respondent Guardtone Inc. As indicated in 
Appellants' Brief, the transaction included a "Reference 
Sales Plan" agreement as particularly indicated in the 
Bonus Appointment Guarantee and in 1:!he Advertising 
Agreemmt above referred to. Hlowever, all of the writ-
ten instruments. and particularly the Contract, the Bonus 
Appointment Guarantee and the Advertising Agreement 
clearly set forth the fact that Appellants' obligation for 
the purchase price of the merchandise involved should not 
in any way be affected by the promise of possible payment 
to the Appellants as compensation for such referral names 
as may have been submitted by Appellants and for further 
sales of equipment made as a consequence of the furnish-
ing of such names. Appellants freely admit having read 
and understood the documents signed by them (TR. 46, 47, 
53 l and there is no dispute as to the fact that the equip-
ment contracted for was installed in the home of the Ap-
pellants as agreed (TR. 26). As set forth in Appellants' 
Brief, they furnished a substantial number of names to Mr. 
Hughes but as far as Appellants knew, no sales were made 
as a result of the referral names furnished by them. Ap-
pellants freely admitted that they knew that payments for 
the purchase price of the prop2'rty involved were to be 
made directly to Respondent Prudential Federal Savings 
and Loan Association and in fact 6 such payments were 
made to said Respondent (TR. 45, 46, 77), but that the) 
discontinued malting any further payments when they did 
not receive any money from Guardtone of Utah under the 
said Bonus Appointment Guarantee. Appellants acknowl-
dged that they knew that they had themselves been re-
ferred as prospects under the referral plan arrangement 
and that Cecil Chamberlain who had furnished their name 
was paid $100.00 under a similar Advertising Agreement 
by Guardtone Inc. when the Appellants agrea:l to purchase 
the inter-com and fire alarm systems (TR. 62, 63, and 92). 
Appellants further admitted in their testimony that to their 
knowledge 2 or 3 of the persons whose names they fur. 
nished under the referral program were contacted by rep-
resentatives of Guardtone of Utah (TR. 30, 63), and they 
also testified that they understood that such money as they 
might receive under the referral plan could be used by 
them for such purpcr~ as they may desire, and the same 
was not specifically committed to the payment for the 
merchandise contracted for by them (TR. 62, 93). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANT· 
ING JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING TIIE VERDICT 
FOR THE REASON TIIAT TIIE EVIDENCE WAS IN· 
SUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO ESTABLISH 
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THAT THE RESPONDENT GUARDTONE INC. DID 
;~OT INTEND TO PERFORM THE ALLEGED PROM-
ISE TI-IA T THE APPELLANTS COULD RECEIVE SUMS 
VNDER THE ADVERTISNG AGREEMENT SO AS TO 
EN_\BLE THE APPELLANTS TO PAY FOR THE 
SQU1Fl\'IEI\i1 .eUHCHASED BY THEM. 
The main contention of Appellants seems to be that 
ti~,'.\' ,110~dcl be entitlctl to be relieved of their obligation to 
p·.:, ~·.;.' the prop,~rty purchased by them for the reason 
triat it was rciJi'L'sented to them by agents of Guardtone of 
LJ'.c,h or Res;,Jondent Guardtone Inc., that irrespective of 
wh<~iETe' dc<:'.uments they may have signed in the course 
uf tl;e tl'<rnsac1ion, the i:..:ppellants would never have to pay 
£2~· the merchandise from money of their own, but that 
[;::y:-:.1ent in any a.ml all events would come through the 
referral pl2.n arrangement suf ftcient to meet their commit-
L1ents lL"1jer the contracts of purchase, but that at the 
t.me such allesed r2pr~...,entations were made, if in fact 
they ever were mccG.e in such a way, which fact Respond-
ent Cunrdtone Inc. asserts the record in this case belies, 
foe agent of Guardtone of Utah or of Respondent Guard-
tone Inc. never intended to perform under the Bonus Ap-
pointment Guarante·~ er the Advertising Agreement. 
The only evidence offered by the Appellants to estab-
lish this state of mind on the part of Albert J. Hughes is 
tl1e :act that they did not receive any money under the 
Bonus Appointment Guarantee or under the Advertising 
Agreemrnt. In this connection, it is called to the atten-
ticn of the Court that the Bonus Appointment Guarantee 
was between th..:: App·ellant, Russell S. Schow, and Guard-
ton~ of Utah, while it was only the Advertising Agrternent 
which was between the Appellants and Respondent Guarct. 
tone Inc. (Exhibit No. 5 and Exhibit No. 6). 
The only points citEd in Appellants' Brief which they 
contend establish this alleged fraudulent state of mind on 
the part of Albert J. Hughes, were that the tdephone mun. 
her of Guardtone or Utah was changed a nwnber of times 
and finally disconnected; that Albert J. Hughes disap-
peared; the unsupported contention that the Snerirt wa£ 
unable to serve Albert J. Hughes; that Albert J. Hugues 
did not appear at the trial; that three appomtments tor a 
salesman to call on a particular party suggested by the 
Appellants were not kept by Guardtone of Utah; and lastly 
tJhat they did not receive any payments from either Guard-
tone of Utah o.c Respondent Guardtone Inc. In this con· 
nection, attention of the Court is directed to the fact that 
the obligation of Respondent Guardtone Inc. to make pay-
ment wider the Advertising Agreement was in any and ali 
events contingent upon a sale actually being made to some-
one referred by the Appellants and nowhere do the Appel· 
!ants contend that any such sale was in fact made. 
Notwithstanding the position taken by Appellants in 
their Brief, the testimony of the Appellants themselvt'S 
eliminates the contention of a fraudulent state of mind oo 
the part of Albert J. Hughes at the time the contract was 
entered into because, as testified to by the Appellants, they 
both knew that their names had been referred by one Cecil 
Chamberlain who was paid the $100.00 referral fee under 
an Advertising Agreement by Respondent Guardtone Jnc. 
soon after the Appellants signed the contractual agree-
ments, (TR. 62, 63, 92) and that Appellants kneW of at 
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leru."i two or three persons whose names they had furnished 
who had been contacted (TR. 30 and 63). 
As stated in 23 American Jurisprudence, page 799: 
"It is a general rule that fraud cannot be predicated 
upon statements which are promissory in their nature 
when made and which relate to future actions or con-
duct, upon the mere failure to perform a promise (non-
performance of a contractual obligation) or upon fail-
ure to fulfill an agreement to do something at a future 
time or to make good sub",,,equent conditions which 
have been assured. Such non-performance alone has 
frequently been held not even to constitute evidenre 
of fraud." (See Papanikolas -vs- Sampson 73 Utah 
404; 27 4 P.ac. 856) . 
This Honorable Court in the case of Nelson -vs- Lem-
ington Mines and Exploration Corporation 87 Utah 69, 48 
Pac. 2nd 439, held that fraud involved in a fraudulent rep-
resentation must relate to facts then existing or which 
have pre\>iously existed and generally the failure to make 
good on a promise is merely a breach of contract which 
must be enforced by action on the contract, if at all, and 
that in order to predicate an action for fraud upon failure 
to perform a promise, there must be an intention an the 
part of the promissor at the time of making the promi1E 
not to perform. Non-performance of a promise alone is 
not evidence of fraud. 
It is true it is stated in 23 American Jurisprudence at 
page 885, that a majority of American Courts hold that 
fraud may be predicated on promises made with the pres-
ent intention not to perform them or, as the rule is fie.. 
quently expressed, on promises made without an intention 
of performance, and that for such fraudulent promises re-
lief may be had as the circumstances and issues presented 
demand, citing Hull -vs- Flinde:.c; 83 Utah 158; 27 Pac. 2nd 
56, and as pointed out by this Honorable Court in the case 
of Fleming -v~ Fieming-Felt Compan:,', 7 Utah 2nd 293 
323 Pac. 2nd 712, ' 
"It . t c1- be . . ' . J · IS no -.o · garnsam tnat w1 e1· sonk ._ircurmtar,ce3 
it may be po3sible to shO'\V that a P~'o:n;ssor has a Df'. 
conceived determination not to perform, but such i:.:L:;; 
be shown by clear and convincing e\rid2nc:e." 
But the burden of establishing such fraud as charged here 
by the Appellants is that such fraud must be shown b~ 
clear and convincing evidence, Kelly -v&- Salt Lake Tra&· 
portation Company, 100 Utah 436; 116 Pac. 2nd 383; Uni-
ve~ C.I.T. Credit Corp. -vs- Sohm, 15 Utah 2nd 262, 391 
Pac: 2nd 293. 
Respondent Guardtone Inc. submits that there is no 
clear and convincing evidence in this case as to foe state 
of mind of Albert J. Hughes at the time of the transactions 
involved not to perform under the Bonm Appointment 
Guarantee or the Advertising Agre€ment, but on the con· 
trary, the evidence from the Appellants thems:lv2s is that 
there was an intention to perform since at least partial p€r· 
formance did in fact occur within the knowledge of Appel· 
lants. Appellants did not testify or show tlwt they had 
contracted any of the persons whose names were submittetl 
by them to see whether or not they had in fact been con· 
tacted by Guardtone of Utah other than the one person 
referred to on Page 5 of the Appellants' Brief, as contrested 
with thEir te3timony hereinabove indicated that they did 
know of at least two or three who had been so contactro .. 
Respondent Guardtone Inc. further asserts that in any 
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event the Appellants did not rely or have any right to rely 
upon any promises indicated in the Bonus Appointment 
Guarante and the Advertising Agreement insofar as their 
obligation under the Home Modernization Contract to pay 
for the merchandise bought is concerned, since all instru-
ments, as herein.above indicated, specifically and clearly 
set forth the fact that ·any agreement for compensation 
under the Bonus Appointment Guarantee or the Advertis-
ing Agreement should not in any way affect the obligation 
of Appellants to pay as set forth by the terms and condi-
tic.ms of the contracts for the purchase of the equipment 
tllerein described. 
Respondent Guardtone Inc. submits that the Court 
below did not err in granting the Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding The Verdict on the grounds that there 
was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to show any 
fraud on the part of Respondent Guardtone Inc. In fact, 
the only evidence in the case on the matter, which evidence 
is testimony of the Appellants themselves, compels the con-
dusion that there was every intention to perform at the 
time the instruments were signed and that in fact there 
was at least partial performance as evidenced by the fact 
that some of the names submitted by the Appellants were 
contacted, the edvertising agreement fee of $100.00 was 
paid to the person who referred the names of the Appel-
lants, and Appellants could say that to their knowledge 
actually only one person whose name was submitted was 
not cont.acted. Inasmuch as the general rule is that non-
performance alone is not even evidence of fraud and since 
the allegation of fraud must be shown by clear and con-
vincing evidence, the Appellants failed to make out a case 
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as a matter of law and the action of the trial Court should 
therefore be sustained. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN SEPARAT-
ING THE APPELLANTS CLAIMS FOR TRIAL AND IN 
EXCLUDING PROFERRED ALLEGEID EVIDENCE OF 
OTHER FRAUDULENT PROMISES AND NON-PER-
FORMANCE. 
Under Rule 20(b) and Rule 42(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the trial Court has the discretion to i~­
quire that separate issues be tried separately and was 
clearly within the scope of these rules when it directe<l 
that the claims of the Appellants be tried first independent 
of the other Plaintiffs named in the Complaint. 
Insofar as the off er of proof ref erred to in the Appel-
lants' Brief at page 9 is concerned, it was apparently Appel· 
lants' intention rto oa.11 other witnesses who had entered in· 
to contracts with Guardtone of Utah an.d Respondent 
Guardtone Inc. under similar circumstances testified to by 
the Appellants. Since the only basis for the fraud alleged 
by Appellants was complete non-performance by Guard-
tone of Utah and Respondent Guardtone Inc., which alle-
gation was, as hereinbefore pointed out, not borne out by 
the testimony of Appellants themselves, and since mere 
evidene of non-performance is generally held not even to 
constitute evidence of fraud (23 Am. Jur. 799; Papaniko-
las -vs- Sampson, Supra), compounding such evidence could 
be of no assistance in the detrminatioo of the matter as a 
matter of law, and the Court was within its rights in ex· 
eluding such evidence. 
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The Coort further had before it in the case, Answers 
to Interrogatories propounded by the Appellants to Re-
spondent Guardtone Inc. on behalf of all of the named 
Plaintiffs in the action, sp2dfically Interrogatory No. 6 
(R. 78), where it was rquired of Respondent Guardtone 
Inc. to furnish information concerning payments made 1.Ul-
der the Advertising Agreement. In the Answers to such 
;r.t2rrogatories ( R. 90) , payments were indicated which 
clearly refute a.riy co-ntention that Respondent Guardtone 
L11c. had no intention to perform. 
The trial Court had full discretion to separate the 
claims of the various and numerous Plaintiffs for trial and 
denial of Appellants' offer to provide repetitious 1:e$timony 
of legally insufficient evidence was not error. 
POINT ID 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DEf'ERMINING 
THAT PLAINTIFFS ARE INDEBTED TO PRUDEN-
'ITAL ON THE CONTRACT SUED UPON. 
The Court submitted to the jury the question of 
whether Plaintiffs by their dealings with Prudential, had 
elected to treat Prudential as the asfilgnee, owner and pay-
ee of the contract L11 question. The jury's answer was 
"Yes." <R. 154, 155). This finding of the jury is amply 
supported by the evidence. 
Mr. Schow signed a statement addressed t.o Pruden-
tial to the effect that the materials and/or work described 
in the Home Modernization Contract dated Sept.ember 12, 
1962, had been delivered and completed to his satisfaction 
(Ex. 12) . Plaintiffs were advised, in writing, by Pruden-
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tial that it had purchased their Home Improvement Note 
(Ex. 13). Mr. Schow testified fuat he knew they were 
dealing with Prudential and that payment for the mer. 
chandise was to be made direct to Prudential (TR. 45, 46, 
77). Thereafter Plaintiffs made six payments of $29.40 
each to Prudential as provided for in the contract (TR. 
55). Plaintiffs received a CQIU!pon book from Prudential. 
Mrs. Schow advised Prudential that "Our name on our 
coupon payment book was spelled wrong." (Ex. 13). Mrs. 
Schow had three telephone conversations with someone 
at Prudential, two with reference to the installation of the 
equipment and one in connection with Ex. 13 (TR. 82). 
Appellants argue that when a person sues on an as-
signed claim the obligor is entitled to the protection of be-
ing assured that payment to the assignee will discharge 
the obligation. Appellants have such protection in this 
case. Guardtone of Utah and Guardtone Inc., are parties 
in this action, have been served with proceS3 and are suiJ. 
ject to the order of the Court. Neither has ~ed own· 
ership of, or a claim on the contract herein sued upon. 
They are both bound by the judgment of this Court to the 
effect that Prudential is the owner of the contract. 
Respondent Guardtone Inc. submits that Section 25· 
1-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, cited by Appellants, has 
no bearing on the question at hand. The record discloses 
no evidence which would support a contention that Guard-
tone of Utah made any assignment of the contract with an 
intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor. 
The jury found that the Appellants elected to treat 
Prudential as the assignee, owner and payee of the oon· 
tract in question. There is no evidence to the controJY· 
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Appellants are protected against any claim on the contract 
in question being asserted by Guardtone of Utah and Guard-
tone Inc. Such being true, the Court did not err in hold-
ing that Appellants are obligated to Prudential on the con-
t.rd.ct sued upon. 
CONCLUSION 
The action of the Court below should be affirmed. 'I1he 
evidence introduced by the Appellants at the trial was in-
sufficient as a matter of law to support the jury verdict 
against Respondent Guardtone Inc. Not only did the evi-
dence show that Appellants were willing to lend their 
names to the referral sales program, but there was sub-
stantial evidence introduced by Appellants themselves to 
compel the conclusion that Respondent Guardtone Inc. 
fully intend€d to perform and did perform any promises 
attributable to it at the time the contracts involved were 
executed. The evidence showed no fraud on the part of 
Respondent Guardtone Inc., or anyone else, much less es-
tablish it in a clear and convincing way. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent, Guardtone, Inc. 
